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   This paper explores the potential contribution of Asia’s sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
to the reform of the global foreign exchange reserve system. By diversifying the investment 
of Asia’s huge reserves into non-dollar denominated assets, Asian SWFs can help to dilute 
the dominant role of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. At the same time, by 
exposing reserve managers to a more diverse mix of currencies and asset classes, SWFs 
will better prepare them for the less dollar-centric global reserve system of the future. In 
addition to SWFs, other innovative policy options for more active reserve management 
include transferring some surplus reserves into national pension funds or into exchange 
traded funds which are distributed among local investors. Regardless of the exact form of 
more profit-oriented reserve management, it will require that countries build up a critical 
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1 Background for the rise of sovereign wealth funds in developing Asia 
   Understanding the role of developing Asia's sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the reform 
of the global reserve system requires a good understanding of why these funds have 
emerged in the region in the first place.
1 Key to the rise of Asia’s SWFs was the massive 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves prior to the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis: in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and particularly since 2000, 
there has been an explosive growth in Asia’s reserves, driven primarily by large and 
persistent current account surpluses, but often also augmented by capital account inflows. 
This is a relatively recent phenomenon: before the Asian financial crisis in the late 90’s, the 
region as a whole ran a current account deficit. That is, Asia as a whole has switched from 
being a net capital importer to a net capital exporter relatively recently.  
  Figure 1 below shows the growth in Asia's FX reserves between 1990 and 2008 in both 
nominal and inflation-adjusted terms. During this period, Asia’s reserves rose from 
US$202 billion to US$3,371 billion in nominal terms. The average annual nominal growth 
rate of reserves was therefore 16.9%, 13.4% and 21.5% for 1990-2008, 1990-2000 and 
2000-2008, respectively. The pattern was similar in inflation-adjusted terms, with reserves 
growing from US$267 billion to US$2,697 billion. The overall picture is very clear – 
secular growth in Asia’s reserves since 1990, punctuated by a further noticeable 
acceleration since 2000. 
[Figure 1] 
   To get a more accurate perspective on Asia's reserve growth, once can scale the region's 
reserves by its GDP. After all, Asia has grown more rapidly than other parts of the world 
since 1990, so the reserve growth may simply reflect the growth of its output over time. 
Figure 2 below shows the amount of FX reserves relative to GDP. Asia’s reserves-to-GDP 
ratio rose from 13.1% in 1990 to 21.9% in 2000 and further to 40.2% in 2008.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, developing Asia refers to the 44 developing member countries (DMCs) of the Asian 
Development Bank. Please refer to www.adb.org for a full list of those countries.   3
[Figure 2] 
   There is yet another measure worth examining – the share of the region’s reserves as part 
of global reserves. Figure 3 below shows that the share of global reserves accumulated by 
developing Asia rose from 22.4% in 1990 to 34.7% in 2000 and further to 48.1% in 2008. 
This means that Asia has indeed been building up reserves more than twice as fast as the 
rest of the world. China accounts for more than 50% of Asia's reserve growth between 




2 Why did Asia accumulate so much in reserves?  
   To some extent, the accumulation reflects the determination of the region’s central banks 
to avoid a repeat of the Asian crisis. It is impossible to overstate the enduring psychological 
impact of the devastating Asian crisis on the region's collective self-confidence. The one 
universal lesson drawn from the crisis by the region’s governments is that the best 
guarantee against the catastrophic risks of volatile capital flows is to build up a large war 
chest of reserves. Using reserves to insure or protect oneself against Asian crisis-type 
financial turmoil is known as the precautionary or self-insurance demand for reserves. 
Disillusionment with the IMF’s handling of the Asian crisis has led Asian countries to buy 
less efficient self-insurance in the form of reserve accumulation. 
    The other major traditional motive for holding reserves is the mercantilist motive of 
promoting exports and discouraging imports.
2 The general tendency among Asian countries 
has been to prevent their currencies from becoming stronger in order to preserve their 
export competitiveness. Accumulating reserves in order to promote exports and discourage 
imports is known as the mercantilist demand for holding reserves. Asia, in particular East 
                                                 
2 For an extended discussion of the mercantilist and precautionary demands for reserves, please refer to 
Aizenman and Lee (2007).    4
Asia, has traditionally relied heavily on exports as an engine of economic growth. In truth, 
in light of the two stylized facts – Asia's export-led growth strategy and its deep-seated fear 
of a recurrence of the traumatic Asian crisis – both precautionary and mercantilist motives 
are likely to have been in play. Furthermore, the two motives are by no means mutually 
exclusive. Reserves which are the consequence of rapid export growth due to competitive 
exchange rates can serve precautionary self-insurance purposes as well. 
   In addition to the precautionary and mercantilist motives for holding reserves, there is a 
third possible incentive. A widely cited theoretical advantage of fixed exchange rates over 
flexible exchange rates is that the former provides a more conducive environment for 
international trade and capital flows by reducing the volatility and uncertainty of exchange 
rates. For example, promoting intra-European trade and financial integration were two of 
the most important objectives behind the creation of the euro. East Asia in particular is 
highly integrated into the world economy, in terms of both trade and capital flows. 
Furthermore, FDI has been an important ingredient of economic growth in many Asian 
countries. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the region has long had an 
inclination toward rigid exchange rates, especially with respect to the US dollar. 
3 Did Asia have "too much" reserves prior to the global financial crisis? 
   Reserve accumulation not only yields benefits but entails costs as well. The three major 
costs of reserve accumulation often cited by economists are the risk of domestic 
inflationary pressures, fiscal costs related to the issuance of sterilization debt, and the 
potential for higher domestic interest rates. One additional risk which has come to the fore 
more recently is the prospect of a sustained depreciation of the main reserve currency, the 
US dollar, which would entail large balance sheet losses. Since reserves entail both costs 
and benefits, the optimal level of reserves is neither infinite nor zero. There is a great deal 
of uncertainty about what constitutes the optimal level of reserves.    5
   Notwithstanding such uncertainty, there was a fairly strong consensus prior to the recent 
crisis that Asia's unprecedented reserve build-up since 2000 led to sub-optimally large 
reserves. That is, Asia's reserves may have reached levels which were substantially higher 
than all plausible estimates of what the region may need for traditional liquidity purposes. 
The conventional way to test for the existence of surplus or excess reserves is to use several 
traditional measures of reserve adequacy. According to Park and Estrada (2009a), all such 
measures – i.e. ratio of reserves to short-term debt, ratio of reserves to M2 money supply, 
and the number of months of import cover – suggested that the region had more than 
adequate reserves. In addition, the balance of evidence from formal econometric research 
also implies the presence of surplus reserves in Asia prior to the recent crisis. 
4 Asia's SWFs as a policy response to surplus reserves 
   Much  of  the  research  strongly  indicated  that at the margin, additional reserves were 
subtracting from rather than adding to national welfare in the region. Therefore, it would be 
logical to surmise that many reserve-rich Asian countries could improve their welfare by 
slowing down or even reversing their reserve build-up. The best way to have done this 
would have been not to accumulate so much reserves in the first place, for example by not 
running large and persistent current account surpluses or by liberalizing restrictions on 
capital outflows. However, given that there is a substantial amount of surplus reserves 
already accumulated and managed by regional central banks and monetary authorities, the 
second-best solution might be to manage at least a portion of such reserves more actively 
with the goal of maximizing returns rather than managing liquidity. The notion that 
developing Asia should reallocate some of its reserves from safe and liquid but low-
yielding assets to less safe and liquid but high-yielding assets is not only politically popular, 
but also economically sound.  
   Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are a natural blueprint for the proposed shift of surplus 
FX reserves from passive liquidity management to active profit-seeking investment. In   6
contrast to central banks, which traditionally manage reserves for liquidity purposes, SWFs 
use reserves to pursue commercial profits. As their name implies, SWFs have two defining 
qualities – (1) ownership and control by the government and (2) pursuit of high risk-
adjusted returns or long-run wealth maximization as the central objective.
3 The predictable 
response of regional policymakers to the emergence of large and growing surplus reserves 
has been to set up SWFs as a means of using those resources more productively. More 
generally, even when they did not set up SWFs, many Asian countries were exploring ways 
to manage their surplus reserves more actively. One way to do this is by setting up separate 
portfolios – for liquidity and investment – within central banks. 
   Although the term SWF has been coined only recently by Rozanov (2005), these funds 
have been around for a long time. In fact, the world's oldest SWF – the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA) – was created way back in 1953. Most of the earlier well-established 
SWFs, including KIA, started out as investment vehicles for managing excess revenues 
from exporting natural resources, especially oil. The two notable exceptions were the two 
Singaporean SWFs – Temasek and GIC. The commercial success of some well-established 
SWFs has been a major driving force behind the establishment of SWFs in Asia. In 
particular, due to their impressive long-term investment track records, Temasek and GIC 
have attracted the attention of regional policymakers as a potential benchmark model. New 
SWFs have already been established in Asia and more may be in the planning stages.
4 
Korea set up the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) in 2005 and China followed suit 
with the China Investment Corporation (CIC) in 2007. Table 2 below lists the major SWFs 
of developing Asia. In short, Asian countries are setting up SWFs as a policy tool for 
coping with the relatively new phenomenon of surplus reserves. 
[Table 2] 
                                                 
3  This fairly straightforward and simple notion should not mask the fact that SWFs typically have very 
complex and often undefined liability profiles, which are much more varied and at times even contradictory 
in nature compared to typical liability profiles of other institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
endowments, foundations, etc. 
4 Park (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the emergence of SWFs in developing Asia.   7
   The immediate impact of the global financial crisis has been the re-emergence of safety 
and liquidity rather than investment returns as the dominant objectives of FX reserve 
management in Asia. The severe disruption of global financial markets predictably 
encouraged Asian central banks to join the global flight to safety and quality, thus 
refocusing on liquid asset classes. This meant a temporary lull in the region's pre-crisis 
quest for more active, returns-seeking reserve management, including the establishment 
and expansion of SWFs. However, along with their private sector counterparts, Asia's 
central banks are gradually regaining their risk appetite as global financial markets and the 
world economy return to normalcy. This suggests that while the global crisis had a clearly 
negative impact on Asian SWFs, this impact is likely to be temporary. For example, there 
are reports that China may be planning to inject US$200-250 billion of new capital into 
CIC. 
5 One Alternative to SWF: Active Management of Pension Fund Assets 
   However, not all nations with excess monetary reserves will necessarily view the creation 
of a sovereign wealth fund, or indeed a much more active approach to central bank reserve 
management, as the optimal solution: there may be various political, institutional or 
structural constraints that can present insurmountable obstacles.
5 For these countries, there 
may be an alternative. If politicians and policymakers were prepared to be open-minded 
and innovative in thinking about excess reserves in the context of broader national asset 
and liability management (ALM), there may be a number of ways to optimize the broader 
public sector balance sheet, while at the same time shrinking the overall size of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
   For example, it may be constructive to explore whether some foreign assets currently 
residing in FX reserve portfolios and sterilized with local currency-denominated debt might 
be more optimally swapped against such debt with the national pension reserve funds. This 
                                                 
5 For example, while there are ongoing public debates in Japan, India and Thailand about the pros and cons of 
setting up reserve funded SWFs, some key stakeholders appear to be either hesitant or downright hostile to 
these plans for various reasons specific to each country.   8
would help local monetary authorities, who are reluctant holders of reserves in the first 
place, to shrink their balance sheets, while at the same time helping national pension 
reserve funds expand their allocations to foreign assets in one fell swoop, without the 
associated market impact.  Let us consider this option in more detail. 
   Many reserve-rich countries in Asia, including some with sovereign wealth funds, have 
established large and systemically important state pension funds, with the objective of pre-
funding at least some future sovereign liabilities with respect to old age provision and 
insurance. These funds will only grow in importance, given the rapidly changing 
demographic profile of the region, resulting from dramatic increases in life expectancy, 
decreasing birth rates, and increasing old age dependency ratios.
6 
   These pension reserve funds are still in the accumulation and growth phase: for example, 
Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) – which at  US$ 1.3 trillion is the 
largest pension plan in the world – is expected to peak out in 2050; in Korea, assets in the 
National Pension Service (NPS) – which at US$ 230 billion make it the 5
th largest pension 
fund in the world – will probably accumulate until mid-2040’s; China’s National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) – currently at US$ 100 billion and growing fast –  is unlikely to start 
decumulation prior to 2030.
7    Other similar pension funds in the region include Hong 
Kong’s Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF), Malaysia’s Employee Provident Fund (EPF), 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF), Thailand’s Government Pension Fund (GPF), 
and Taipei, China’s three state pension plans – Public Service Pension Fund, Labour 
Insurance Fund and New Labour Pension Fund. 
      While the decision to set up these funds was, without a doubt, fiscally prudent and 
politically responsible, many of them have been criticised over the years for a number of 
deficiencies stemming from their public ownership: the extremely conservative nature of 
investments, severe restrictions on asset allocation and insufficiently robust governance, 
                                                 
6 For an excellent introduction to the subject and analysis of recent trends in Asia, see Wang J. (2009) 
7 Ibid.   9
which occasionally resulted in political meddling, non-commercially motivated 
investments and poor investment results.
8 
      For purposes of our discussion, we focus on deficiencies related to the long-term 
investment policy of these funds: rigid asset allocation frameworks, over-reliance on 
government bonds and cash, and extreme home bias. In many cases, the resulting 
investment returns are simply too low to meet the future liability shortfall targets these 
funds were originally set up to address. There has been some progress over the last ten 
years, as the funds started to gradually diversify their investment portfolios to include more 
risk exposures and foreign assets.
9 However, given the very large size of these funds and 
their potential market impact, the pace of diversification has been glacial at best.
10 
   In this context, one can look at the challenges of dealing with excess foreign exchange 
reserves and growing sovereign wealth in a completely different light. Unlike the assets of 
strongly ‘home-biased’ national pension reserve funds, excess foreign exchange reserves – 
by definition – are invested exclusively in foreign assets, predominantly government and 
quasi-government bonds and cash. To the extent that the central bank has ventured beyond 
just government bonds and money markets, and especially if some kind of an SWF-type 
arrangement has been set up, such reserves would also include various credit and equity 
instruments in foreign markets. 
   If the principal stakeholders in a reserve-rich Asian nation do not have the political will, 
the risk appetite and the necessary consensus to set up a sovereign wealth fund to manage a 
large portion of national savings with a long-term return objective, then they might want to 
consider restructuring and transferring some of the excess reserves into the national 
                                                 
8 For example, Iglesias and Palacios (2000) analysed 34 publicly-managed pension funds and found that only 
five held less than half of their assets in government bonds. They also found that these funds were often used 
to achieve objectives other than pension provision, as it was difficult to insulate them from political 
interference. As a result, they tended to earn poor rates of return relative to relevant indices and private sector 
peers.  
9 For a more recent analysis of these issues, and specific examples of some improvements in various Asian 
countries, see Brown and Baker (2009) and Wang J. (2009). 
10 Still, some private sector experts forecast further significant shifts in strategic asset allocation at some of 
these funds, leading to a sharp decline in ‘home bias’, a bigger risk appetite, and increased investments in 
equity assets and foreign assets. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Jen and St-Arnaud (2007).   10
pension fund, which may be a politically more palatable and viable vehicle for such long-
term wealth management. In this scenario, the transfer of excess foreign exchange reserves 
into the pension fund would be matched by a counter-transfer of local government bonds 
and cash of equivalent value to the local monetary authorities, who would then be able to 
shrink their balance sheet by the same amount. 
6 Another Alternative to SWF: Exchange Traded Funds 
      The above approach is limited in the sense that it focuses only on restructuring and 
rearranging public sector assets and liabilities. One could be more ambitious and consider 
broader ALM solutions that seek to engage the local private sector. Governments of many 
developing Asian nations have long recognised that their massive accumulation of reserves 
is at least partly driven by the underdeveloped nature of local financial markets, which are 
simply not capable of intermediating massive surplus savings efficiently. In light of this 
recognition, the authorities have worked hard in the years following the Asian financial 
crisis to develop local and regional financial markets, not least by introducing new 
financial instruments and investment vehicles for local companies and households. In this 
context, more ambitious and creative ALM solutions may include the innovative use of 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) or exchangeable bonds to dispose of a portion of excess 
reserves in an orderly and market-friendly way, which could also contribute to the 
broadening and deepening of local and regional financial markets. 
   For example, instead of transferring a foreign bond or stock portfolio from the central 
bank’s reserves to the state pension fund, the authorities may choose to put these assets in a 
special purpose vehicle, which can then be used as the basis for a newly launched ETF, 
denominated in the local currency and distributed among local investors. The same 
approach could be used with respect to sovereign investments in alternative assets, such as   11
real estate and commodities.
11 The local currency amounts raised through such a public 
offering could then be used to retire some of the sterilization debt, helping shrink the public 
sector balance sheet further. 
   Apart from ETFs, the authorities may want to consider disposing of excess reserves by 
issuing bonds exchangeable into baskets of foreign government bonds, stocks or 
commodities. This route may be particularly attractive in the current environment of low 
interest rates, high volatility of risk assets and increasing competition among sovereign 
debt issuers.
12 These instruments could also provide local investors with a very attractive 
potential payoff: a meaningful participation in the upside of the foreign asset, combined 
with the downside protection of the local government bond. For domestic investors not 
used to owning foreign assets, such exchangeable bonds may serve as a useful intermediate 
step to getting more familiar and comfortable with overseas risk exposures. 
   Such actions by the official sector would not be entirely unprecedented: for example, the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) partially disposed of its local share portfolio, 
which it had accumulated during the defence of Hong Kong’s markets against the so-called 
‘double play’ speculators in 1998, via a creative ETF-based solution
13, while some 
                                                 
11 As China, Korea, India, Singapore and other fast-growing, resource-poor Asian nations look to secure a 
stable supply of natural resources, many commentators have focused on how excess reserves and sovereign 
wealth can be used to acquire large minority or even controlling stakes in various energy and mineral 
companies. Another way to achieve this objective, with much less controversy, is to build up and develop 
Asia’s strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) and other commodity reserves. This would be in line with a key 
recommendation from the International Energy Agency (IEA), which prescribes a minimum of 90-day 
petroleum reserves for oil-importing countries. Typically, such reserves are either carried on the public sector 
balance sheet or mandatorily required of the broader industry. One possible innovation to this approach would 
be to create an ETF based on a strategic commodity reserve pool, denominated in the local currency and 
distributed widely among local and international investors. For a general discussion of SPR and related issues, 
see Houssin (2009); for a discussion of China’s FX reserves and SPR plans, see Hsiao (2009). 
12 A new instrument like this can offer the issuing government several potential benefits: it can tap into new 
sources of capital, thus broadening the investor base and diversifying the government’s sources of funding; it 
can be issued with very low or even zero coupons, thus lowering annual debt servicing costs; it can be 
structured in a way that maximises the probability of conversion into the underlying assets during the tenor of 
the bond, thus removing the need to pay back the principal amount at maturity. 
13  In August and September of 1998, HKMA intervened heavily in the local FX and equity markets, 
successfully squeezing out a group of global macro hedge funds that had put on massive short positions in 
both markets. In a matter of just 10 days, HKMA ended up owning a large local share portfolio, comprising 
almost 10% of Hong Kong’s total stock market capitalization. Subsequent disposal presented a series of 
challenges, not least the potential to disrupt the local stock market due to the massive size of the position in 
question. HKMA came up with a novel idea of putting a large portion of their position in an ETF structure   12
European states in the past issued exchangeable bonds to reduce their stakes and lower 
their debt burdens. More recently, the UK Financial Investments (UKFI), the newly created 
entity to hold and manage the shares acquired by the British government in bailed out 
domestic banks, is reportedly considering issuing an exchangeable bond as one possible 
disposal option.
14 
   Some countries that have accumulated massive FX reserves and sovereign wealth, such 
as China, may be in a position to implement all of the above approaches simultaneously: 
the Chinese authorities may want to consider innovative solutions to shrink the overall size 
of reserves by swapping a portion of these assets with NSSF and by releasing another 
portion into the broader market in the form of an ETF or some other financial vehicle, 
while at the same time working to achieve better diversification of the remaining reserves 
and sovereign assets held by SAFE and CIC, respectively. The following quote from Ms. 
Wu Xiaoling, currently vice-president of the financial and economic affairs committee of 
the National People’s Congress and formerly Deputy Governor of PBOC and Chief of 
SAFE, suggests that innovative ALM solutions along these lines may be of direct interest 
and relevance to China:  
      “We should encourage businesses to pool resources into forming a Renminbi Equity 
Investment Fund, which can then buy foreign currency and embark on investment abroad. 
To reduce investment risk, the government may alternatively set up an industrial fund to 
help businesses explore overseas markets… The best way to minimize risk [of the foreign 
reserve portfolio] is to scale down the size of foreign currency reserves.”
15 
   Whichever approach is chosen to restructure and strengthen reserve portfolios, one thing 
is certain: it will require a set of skills and expertise that have much more in common with 
wealth preservation and management than liquidity management. This is why the practice 
                                                                                                                                                    
called ‘The Tracker Fund’ or TraHK, which was then offered to retail and institutional investors at an 
attractive discount. For an excellent discussion of this episode, see Goodhart and Dai (2003). 
14 Aldrick (2009)   
15 Wang, B. (2009)   13
of sovereign wealth management, whether it is deployed in the context of a formal SWF or 
from within the central bank, will be crucial, as it will enable and facilitate reform of the 
global reserve system. 
7 Other Positive Externalities of SWF 
      Another way in which sovereign wealth managers can become part of the broader 
solution is by contributing to free and open flows of capital across borders, and by helping 
facilitate a more commercially sensible and effective intermediation of surplus savings 
from developing countries. The current process of automatically borrowing and channelling 
these savings into US government paper is dictated by policy objectives of a dollar-centric 
global reserve system, not market considerations of return and risk. By managing excess 
reserves less as liquidity and more as sovereign wealth, such national savings can be 
allocated more efficiently to assets and projects that promise better risk-adjusted returns.  
   One potential downside risk to increased sovereign investment in global equity and other 
non-traditional asset markets is the risk of a protectionist backlash. Prior to the global 
financial crisis, SWFs and their investment activity aroused a great deal of concern and 
unease in recipient countries. The overall stereotype of SWFs in these countries was one of 
opaque, well-endowed state-owned entities from countries with different political systems 
and potentially non-commercial political investment objectives seeking to take over firms 
and industries vital to the national interest. 
   The establishment of the Santiago Principles in October 2008 was a direct response to 
recipient-country concerns about investment activities of SWFs. The principles are a 
voluntary set of practices that commit SWFs to refrain from investments that harm the 
national welfare of countries in which they invest. These principles play a valuable role in 
creating a more conducive and friendly environment for SWF investments by allaying fears 
and suspicions of recipient countries toward SWFs, primarily by signalling the goodwill 
and good faith of the SWFs. By reducing the risk of financial protectionism and economic   14
nationalism through their concerted collective efforts, best exemplified by the Santiago 
Principles, SWFs can play a crucial role in maintaining a free and open system of cross-
border capital flows. Financial globalization will, in turn, enable SWFs to diversify the 
currency and asset class composition of their portfolios.
16 
      As they help restructure large reserve portfolios to make them more diversified and 
resilient, and as they help intermediate national savings more efficiently, Asian SWFs 
could also play the role of a catalyst in regional financial integration. As with trade 
linkages, developing Asian countries depend to a disproportionate degree on financial 
linkages with distant industrialized countries. There is a lot of scope for growth in intra-
regional financial linkages. For example, it is a well-known stylized fact that developing 
Asia invests much more of its savings outside the region than within the region. Just as the 
lack of robust intra-regional trade creates a risk that potentially large gains from trade are 
not fully exploited, under-development of intra-regional financial linkages potentially 
entails similarly large opportunity costs. 
   Unlike central banks, which invest in safe and liquid but low-yielding traditional assets 
such as US government bonds, SWFs are free to invest in higher risk assets such as public 
and private equity. As such, developing Asia's SWFs are in a unique position to invest in 
equity and other asset markets of other developing Asian countries - it should be 
remembered that most of the region's capital outflows are intermediated by the official 
sector rather than the private sector. This is where the unique nature and comparative 
advantages of SWFs can become relevant.  
   Fundamentally,  Asian  SWFs  are  commercially operated institutions whose overriding 
objective is typically to maximize risk-adjusted returns over a certain investment horizon. 
At the same time, they are public sector agents, who have explicit or implicit policy 
objectives and are ultimately accountable to political authorities. While in and of itself 
                                                 
16 For information on ‘Santiago Principles’, see the web-site of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds at www.ifswf.org ; for a discussion of how perceptions of SWFs changed in recipient countries 
throughout 2007-09, see Nugee (2009).   15
explicit support for regional financial integration cannot and should not be a hard-wired 
policy objective for Asian SWFs, authorities in developing Asian countries would do well 
to continue their efforts to improve the investment climate for domestic and foreign players. 
This would provide an attractive market environment and a set of incentives for regional 
SWFs to invest increasingly in regional markets. To the extent that regional currencies and 
currency unions become a material part of the debate on reforming the global reserve 
system, increased regional financial linkages facilitated by SWFs can play a role. 
   In a similar vein, if the SDR – or a modified version thereof – is increasingly viewed as a 
legitimate reserve currency alternative, SWFs may be able to play a role in facilitating the 
private sector's use of SDRs. For example, SWFs could potentially become an important 
source of demand for SDR-denominated investment instruments. This would make perfect 
sense in terms of their overriding objective of diversifying currency exposure away from 
the US dollar. A permanent increase in demand for SDR-denominated paper could then 
lead to increased supply of such instruments by private sector issuers seeking long-term, 
stable financing. SWFs could further promote broader acceptance of the SDR by using the 
currency basket as a unit of account. Such use would have the clear benefit of making SWF 
accounts considerably less volatile compared to the use of any single currency for such 
reporting.  
   To be sure, there will be many hurdles complicating this process: safeguard clauses that 
specify what happens if the IMF changes the composition of the SDR; currencies used to 
repay interest and principal; the absence of clear market-making and liquidity provisions; 
and other constraints. However, by virtue of their origin, ownership structure, and 
investment and policy objectives, some SWFs may be uniquely positioned to promote 
private use of the SDR in the ways described above. This could in turn facilitate greater 
public use of the SDR, and in particular the development of an IMF-sponsored ‘substitution 
account’ in which official holders of US dollars could exchange their surplus reserves for   16
SDRs at the IMF. The IMF would then manage these reserves to meet the liabilities of its 
membership with respect to the new SDR-based reserve currency.
17 
   To conclude, sovereign wealth funds – or, as the case may be, reserve managers at central 
banks with very large FX reserves – can play a crucial role as facilitators and enablers of 
reform of the global reserve system. They can do so, first and foremost, by helping 
redesign and restructure the legacy reserve portfolios to make them more robust and 
resilient to the reform of the global reserve system. Second, SWFs can help make 
intermediation of surplus savings more efficient and facilitate an open and free system of 
cross-border capital flows. Third, SWFs can help speed up the formation of stronger intra-
regional financial linkages by investing more broadly and proactively in asset markets 
within the region. Fourth, SWFs can help promote private sector use of SDRs, thus 
facilitating a broader acceptance and use of SDRs and a smoother and more coordinated 
shift to a new global reserve system. 
8 Concluding Observations 
      Sovereign wealth management expertise and techniques, whether deployed by stand-
alone, independent SWFs or by reserve managers from within central banks, might be able 
to help – on a very practical and pragmatic level – Asia’s policymakers to deal with a 
whole set of issues that will inevitably arise in the process of reforming the global reserve 
system. At a broader level, the potential contribution of SWFs is best illustrated in the 
context of their potential impact on the Bretton Woods II framework discussed earlier. The 
creation of SWFs, and a more active approach to managing foreign exchange reserves 
should lower the demand for US Treasuries and, to a certain degree, the demand for the US 
dollar, while at the same time increasing investment demand for a variety of risk assets, 
both in US dollars and in other currencies. This effectively dilutes the benefits of the 
                                                 
17 For a more detailed discussion of the potential role of SWFs in promoting broader acceptance and use of 
SDRs, see Hoguet (2009)   17
Bretton Woods II system for its main stakeholders, particularly the United States, thus 
making the framework weaker and considerably less sustainable.  
      This profound shift in the management of excess foreign exchange reserves in Asia 
would be completely in line with the widely held view on what needs to happen for global 
macroeconomic rebalancing to occur: Asia needs to stop the flow of uneconomically cheap 
financing for its main trading partners by switching to domestic and regional investment 
and consumption and by introducing greater exchange rate flexibility, while the United 
States needs to cut back on borrowing and consumption by increasing its national saving 
rate. 
   The crux of the problem, as with many complicated tasks, is the timing and sequencing of 
such policy shifts and adjustments. Act too quickly, and the social stress and economic 
costs can become too overwhelming, not least in terms of Asian nations incurring 
unacceptably high losses on current massive reserve portfolios. But procrastination and 
failure to act would not solve the problem either: sooner or later, the same stresses and 
costs would still materialise, except they will do so at a timing of nobody’s choosing. 
Therefore, Asia’s policymakers need to start planning macroeconomic policy adjustments 
and reform of the global reserve system as soon as possible, and as they do so, they need to 
consider how to protect and enhance the region’s massive savings, accumulated primarily 
in FX reserve portfolios, from the inevitable impacts and risks that will come from 
reforming the global reserve system. Looking more closely at sovereign wealth funds and 
how they might be able to help in this process would be a constructive step in the right 
direction. 
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Figure 1 
Nominal and Real Foreign Exchange Reserves 











Sources:  Author's estimates based on data from CEIC Data Company Ltd. and   
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online database, both 
downloaded 15 June 2009.   21
Figure 2 
Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to GDP, 
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Sources:  Author's estimates based on data from CEIC Data Company Ltd. and   
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online database, both 
downloaded 15 June 2009. 
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Figure 3 
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Source:  Author's estimates based on data from CEIC Data Company Ltd.,  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics online database, and IMF,   
Currency Composition of  Official Foreign Exchange Reserves,available: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm; all downloaded 15 June 2009. 
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Table 1 





(Billions of US$) 
1  China, Peoples Rep. of  1,946 
 
2 Taipei,China  292 
 
3 India  247 
 
4 Korea,  Rep.  of  200 
5  Hong Kong, China  182 
6 Singapore  174 
 
7 Thailand  108 
8 Malaysia  91 
 
9 Indonesia  49 
10 Philippines  33 
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.;  International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics online database; both downloaded 15 June 2009.   24
Table 2 
Sovereign Wealth Funds of Developing Asia 
Country  Name of fund   Assets 
(US$ Bn
) 
Year  of 
inception 
Type 
Singapore Government  of 
Singapore Investment 
Corporation 





200 2007 Non-commodity 










30 1983  Commodity:  Oil 
Korea, Rep. of  Korea Investment 
Corporation 
20 2005  Non-commodity 
Malaysia Khazanah  Nasional 
BHD 
15 1993  Non-commodity 
Kazakhstan  National Oil Fund  15  2000  Commodity: Oil, 
gas, metals 
Taipei, China  National  Stabilization 
Fund 
15 2000  Non-commodity 
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  1.6  1999  Commodity: Oil 
Timor Leste  Petroleum Fund  1.22  2005  Commodity: Oil 
and gas 
Uzbekistan Fund  for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
0.5   2006   Commodity and 
non-commodity 
Kiribati Revenue  Equalization 
Reserve Fund 
0.47   1956  Commodity: 
Phosphate mining 






India  To be named    n.a.  n.a.  Non-commodity 
Thailand  To be named    n.a.  n.a.  Non-commodity 
Source: Park and Estrada (2009b) 